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INTRODUCTION
The instant case w7as initially brought by Carmen Finan ("Finaif'). a now-deceased
sibling of Defendant and Appellee. Luke L. Adams ("Adams"). The deceased Plaintiffs
daughters have continued this action as representatives of her estate and trustees of her trust with
the goal of protecting their mother's interests (and now their own inherited interests). The matter
concerns a contractual agreement between Finan and her brother. Luke L. Adams. At the trial
level the case turned on initial incorrect findings of fact and law in favor of Appellee. The
correction of these findings would untangle a chain of subsequent decisions and inequities which
resulted. Because the necessary findings were initially decided incorrectly by the trial court,
later claims toppled like a row of dominos and further motions for relief were doomed even
before they were brought. Specifically, the District Court ruled against Appellants" motion for
summary judgment in this action due to Appellee's statute of limitations defense brought in a
cross-motion for summary judgment. When Appellants attempted to seek relief from portions of
the court's final judgment of the motion for summary judgment with a timely motion under Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court again denied this relief. These judicial
missteps have led the Appellants to file this appeal in hopes of obtaining a proper legal remedy.
The most egregious finding of fact decided by the court was that Appellee did not
conceal the 22 January 1999 transfer of title of the property in question. This decision led to the
Appellants' inability to use Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule to toll the six-year statute of
limitations associated with the action. The statute of limitations was the defense Appellee relied
upon in its memorandum for cross-motion for summary judgment and the defense that the court
used to affirm Appellee's cross-motion for summary7 judgment.

Appellants believe that had the court decided this factual conclusion differently. Appellee
wouldn't have been able to win his cross-motion for summary judgment with the statute of
limitations defense. Thus. Appellants would have been entitled to their rightful inheritance of
10.135% of the property in question, the value of which has increased substantially since the
inception of the referenced Trust Deed Note. With the statue of limitations decision reversed,
Appellee would owe Appellants 10.135% of the sale price of the property in question, as
specified in the original Note and Trust Deed.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-102(3)Q)(2011).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues at bar are as follows:
1.

Did the trial court err in holding that the recording of real estate transfers pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 provided constructive notice to a party to a contract
who had no legal interest in the real property sufficient to begin a statute of
limitations?
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation and application of a statute is reviewed
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Berneau v.
Martino. 2009 UT 87, 223 P.3d 1128.
Preservation of Issue in the Record: R. at 342-43; 448 (constructive notice pursuant to
recording statute insufficient for breach of contract claim): 577-83: 581-84: 586: 590-91:
598-602^609; 611.

2.

Did the trial err in granting summary judgment to Appellee when there are
material facts in dispute as to whether Appellee concealed his actions from the
Appellant during the 22 January 1999 and subsequent 2004 transfers?
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness, affording no deference to their legal conclusions. Wavment v. Clear
Channel Broadcasting Inc.. 2005 UT 25. 116^P.3d 271.

Preservation of Issue in the Record: R. at 92-93: 341; 444-48 (fraud): 581-84: 586: 591:
598-602: 609 (fraud): 611.
Did the trial court err in its application of the statute of limitations under Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2) by finding that Appellants were barred by the six-year
statute of limitations, and in its decision to not apply the equitable discovery rule?
Standard of Review7: A trial court's application of a statute of limitations and the
discover}7 rule are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness, affording no
deference to the trial court's conclusions. However, the application of the discovery rule
also involves a subsidiary factual determination which is reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Jensen v. Young. 2010 UT 67. 245 P.3d 731: Colosimo v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake Citv. 2004 UT App 436, 104 P.3d 646.
Preservation of Issue in the Record: R. at 342-43; 444-45 (fraud); 577-83; 590; 609.
In the alternative, did the trial court err when it determined that the Defendant's
transfer of the property into he and his wife's name as joint tenants was an event of
transfer sufficient to trigger Defendant's obligations to Plaintiff?
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a contract is a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co.. 2009 UT 5. 201
P.3dl004.
Preservation of Issue in the Record: R. at 342-43; 577-83; 587 (conveyance to self and/or
to spouse and self as joint tenants is not a transfer contemplated by the contract); 590.
Should the constructive notice statute used by the District Court, Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-3-102, be struck down for vagueness or violating property Utah owners' due
process rights?
Standard of Review7: A trial court's interpretation of a contract is a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co.. 2009 UT 5, 201
P.3dl004.
Preservation of Issue in the Record: This is not preserved in the record because there was
no issue of Constitutional rights until the District Court determined that the recording
statute mandates that recording imparts notice to all the world, including notice of
violations of contract law sufficient for contract statutes of limitations to run.
Did the Court err by not granting Finan's motion for summary judgment and
ordering Adams to pay §126,418.30 (10.135% of S1.25 million) for the appreciated
value of the property pursuant to the terms of the note after finding him in default
or, alternatively, ordering the foreclosure of the property and payment of 10.135%
of the sales price to Finan?

Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a contract is a question of lawr which
is reviewed for correctness. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co.. 2009 UT 5. 201
P.3dl004.
Preservation of Issue in the Record: R. at 93-96.
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation
is determinative of the appeal or of central important to the appeal:
•
•

Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This case regards a breach of contract and judicial foreclosure over
property inherited by three siblings. The siblings entered into a trust agreement memorialized by
a trust deed and note governing the shares of property each sibling was entitled to. When the
original plaintiff sued to enforce her rights under the note and trust agreement, she was barred by
the statute of limitations, among other findings. This appeal resulted.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court: The course of proceedings in this
case is further detailed in the Statement of Facts below. In short, the original plaintiff in this
matter. Carmen R. Finan (now represented by Appellants Christine B. Helfrich and Mary Anne
Chesarek) filed suit on 14 September 2007 to enforce the trust agreement and note and foreclose
on the inherited property. (R. at 1-13.) Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment on 30
July 2010 and Appellee filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 16 August 2010. (R. at
88. 174.) On 7 April 2011. final judgment of Judge John R. Morris was granted in favor of
Appellee's cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. at 417.) Specifically. Judge Morris
concluded that Appellee transferred title to the property to a joint tenancy in 1999 and transferred
title again in 2004 but that the 1999 transfer triggered his obligations under the trust agreement.
The Court found Appellee failed to honor his obligations under the note but did not conceal the

transfer. The court also concluded that when the original plaintiff. Carmen R. Finan. filed suit,
she was not within the applicable six-year statute of limitations. On these grounds, the court
granted Appellee's cross-motion for summary judgment and denied Appellants* motion for
summary judgment. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on 2 May 2011. (R. at 424.) On
24 June 2011. Appellants filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order and the court filed an
order denying Appellants* rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order. (R. at 437. 564.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1. The present action was filed on 14 September 2007 by the Plaintiff/Appellant Carmen R.
Finan for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The original Plaintiff died in 2010.
The successors and representatives of the Carmen R. Finan estate and trustees of the
Carmen R. Finan Trust, Christine B. Helfrich and Mary Anne ChesareL continued this
action against Defendant/Appellee Luke L. Adams.
2. Carmen R. Finan ("Finan") and Luke L. Adams ("Adams"), along with Frankie A. Emley
("Emley"), are the children of Frank and Leona Adams. Appellants Christine B. Helfrich
and Mary Anne Chesarek are Carmen Finan's daughters. (R. at 100-103.)
3. Frank Adams and Leona Adams were deceased in 1981 and 1985 respectively. (R. at
100-103.)
4. Leona Adams survived her husband Frank and inherited his property. At the time of her
death, Leona Adams left behind an estate including significant property holdings.
However, when the estate was divided. Adams received property with greater value than
that received by Finan and Emley. (R. at 100-103.)

As a result of the uneven distribution. Finan and Emley entered into an agreement with
Adams whereby Finan and Emley would receive financial consideration in the future
from Adams. (R. at 100-103.)
The parties and Emley reduced their agreement to writing through a Trust Deed and Trust
Deed Note ("Note"), executed on May 13. 1991. secured by property and water shares
Appellee inherited from Leona Adams. (R. at 105-106, 108-110.)
Under the Note, Carmen Finan and Frankie Emley were granted a one-half interest each
in $26,340.00. which was 20.27% of the agreed upon value of the property at the time of
the agreement. (R. at 108-110.)
Under the terms of the Note, if the Defendant were to sell the property, Finan and Emley
would be entitled to 20.27% of the sale price, but a minimum of $26,340.00, and amount
representing the agreed fair market value of the property in 1991. (R. at 109.)
Under the terms of the Note, the principal amount w7as due and payable upon, among
other things, the sale, assignment, or transfer of the property. (R. at 108-110.)
The principal amount bore no interest, unless payment was not timely made, at which
time interest was to accrue at 12% per annum. (R. at 109.)
The provisions of the trust deed note were drawn to provide for a greater payment to
Finan in the event the property appreciated in value over time, with all parties enjoying
the increase in value to their mother's estate. (R. at 100-103.)
Appellee acquired Emley*s interest in the deed and note upon her death. (R. at 101.)
As a result, the trust deed in Finan* s favor encumbers a 10.135% share of the property
which is paid upon the sale of the property following Adams* default. (R. at 100-103.
109).

14. Under both the trust deed and trust deed note. Finan is entitled to reasonable costs and
attorney's fees upon default by the Defendant. (R. at 105-106. 108-110.)
15. On or about 22 January 1999. the property in question was transferred by Appellee to
himself and Diana C. Adams as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. at 112.)
16. Appellee caused the deed for the 1999 transfer to be recorded with the Davis County
Recorder. The deed was stamped "Recorded'* on 22 January 1999. (Book 2434, Page
876.)
17. Appellee provided Finan no notice of the 1999 transfer. (R. at 102.)
18. The 1999 transfer at least partially triggered Appellee's payment obligations under the
Note and Appellee failed to make these payments to Finan pursuant to the Note.
19. On or about 4 January 2005, the property was again transferred to Appellee and Diana C.
Adams as trustees of the Luke L. Adams Trust dated 2 December 2004 and the Diana C.
Adams Trust dated 2 December 2004. (R. at 114-116.)
20. Appellee again provided Finan no notice of the 2005 transfer. (R. at 102.)
21. Prior to Emley's death, neither Emley nor Finan ever made a demand nor an inquiry upon
Adams regarding payment on the Note. Sometime after Emley*s death. 22 February
2006. did Finan make her initial demand on the Note. (R. at 183).
22. In November 2006. Appellee filed a Petition to Approve Payment of Promissory Note
and Authorize Partial Distribution of Estate ("Petition") in the probate case of Frankie
Emley stating that no event of transfer of the property had occurred, and that the
promissory note was not due or payable (R. at 468-73.) Using the Petition. Appellee
sought court approval to pay his obligation to his sister. Frankie Ernie)-, under the terms
of the promissory note to Ms. Emley* s estate, of which he was one of the personal

representatives. Id. Throughout this litigation. Appellee claimed just the opposite, i.e.
that a transfer had occurred. (R. at 17. 181.)
23. Since the time of the agreement, the property has appreciated greatly in value. On 12
May 2010. an appraisal was conducted for the property and its accompanying water
shares, which appraised for one million, two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($1,250,000.00). Currently. 10.135% of the property's said value is equal to one hundred
twenty six thousand four hundred eighteen dollars and thirty cents. ($126,418.30). (R. at
120.) Summary of Appraisal Report generally (R. at 118-174.)
24. Because Finan had no notice of the two transfers by Appellee. Appellee remained in
possession of the property following both acts of transfer. Appellee had stated in court
filings that no event of transfer had occurred, and Finan did not discover the transfers
until 2006. Upon her discover}7 of the transfers. Finan expeditiously brought suit to
enforce her rights under the Trust Deed Note in 2007. (R. at 1-13.)
25. Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment on 30 July 2010. (R. at 88-89.)
26. Appellee filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 16 August 2010. (R. at 174176.)
27. On 7 April 2011. final judgment of Judge John R. Morris was granted in favor of
Appellee's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 417-419.)
28. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on 2 May 2011. (R. at 420-421).
29. On 24 June 2011. Appellants filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order. (R. at 437438.)
30. On 6 January 2012. the court filed Judge John R. Morris's order denying Appellants*
Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in deciding a number of critical findings of fact and conclusions of
law in its decision to deny Appellants" Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 7 April 2011.
The court erred again when it refused to grant the Appellants* Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
Order which presented newly discovered evidence showing that Appellee concealed and
misrepresented evidence relating to the accrual of Appellants' claims.
The District Court erred when it decided that Appellee's recording of a quit-claim deed
on its own property (but subject to Appellants' Trust Deed) put Appellants on constructive notice
of a breach of the Note, thus starting the clock on the contract's statute of limitations. Appellants
were not on constructive notice of the property's 1999 transfer. Utah courts hold that parties such
as Appellants have no duty to check title for an illegal recording, absent some triggering event.
The District Court incorrectly found that there were no material facts in dispute and that
Appellee did not conceal the transfers of land that he made to his wife on 22 January 1999. The
court also incorrectly found that Appellee did in fact fraudulently conceal the applicable
transfers.
The District Court's erred in deciding that Appellants' claims were barred by the six-year
statute of limitations for contract claims. The Appellee's fraudulent concealment of facts should
have triggered Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule. Due to Appellee's fraudulent concealment the
statue of limitations should be tolled until discovery of the concealed facts. With equitable
tolling in effect under Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule. Appellants did not have constructive
notice of Appellee's transfers.

Alternatively, the trial court erred by deeming Appellee's 1999 transfer to himself and his
spouse as joint tenants as an action sufficient to trigger his obligations to Appellants. If this
action hadn't triggered his obligations to Appellants, then their 2007 lawsuit would have easily
been within the six-year statute of limitations. However, this argument assumes that those
mentioned before it are rejected by the Court of Appeals. As applied, this statute should be
stricken as void for vagueness and for allowing illegal seizure of Appellants* property in
violation of the Utah and U.S. Constitution.
ARGUMENTS
1.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RECORDING OF
REAL ESTATE TRANSFERS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102
PROVIDED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO A PARTY TO A CONTRACT WHO
HAD NO LEGAL INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY SUFFICIENT TO
BEGIN A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The District Court erred when it applied Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102, a statute governing the

recording of real estate documents, to the Note in the instant case. The statute has no
applicability to the contractual nature of the instant case as Title 57 itself is entitled "Real Estate"'
and relates specifically and solely to real estate matters. The statute reads, in relevant part:
"(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with Section
57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying with
Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502.
whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate
county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.'* Utah Code Ann. § 57-3102(1).
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2010).
While the statute is clear in saying that from the time of recording with a county recorder
each document shall impart notice to all persons, this applies to real estate deeds and related
documents. It imparts notice "of their contents/' not of the event of transfer which triggers a

contract breach and running of a contract statute of limitations. However, the court erred when it
applied this real estate statute to what is essentially a written contract between Appellants and
Appellee. The Trust Deed Note conveys contractual terms merely secured by property and water
rights. The Note itself is not a deed but is instead a contract and thus is not subject to Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-102. Thus, when Appellee made a transfer under the Note, even though this transfer
was duly recorded, constructive notice to all the world does not necessarily follow. Under the
contractual terms of the Trust Deed Note, transfer for any reason and in any manner triggers
Appellee's obligation to pay Appellants under the contract. Despite the two transfers having
occurred. Appellee has not made payment as required by the contract. Thus, Appellee has
breached the contract, and Appellants have been damaged by such breach.
A. Appellants were not on constructive notice of the property's 1999 transfer and
recording by virtue of the recording of the quit claim deed with the Davis County
Recorder's Office
The District Court found that Ms. Finan was on constructive notice of the property's 1999
transfer and that Appellants' causes of action accrued by virtue of the recording of Appellee's
quit claim deed. (R. at 414-416.) For purposes of evidence marshalling, the evidence relied
upon by the court appears to be facts not in dispute. While the court found that Finan knew of
the 1999 transfer sometime after 2001 (R. at 411). i.e. 2002 or later, which is less than the sixyear statute of limitations for contracts considering the 2007 filing date of the case, in reality the
undisputed evidence from Adams* own declaration shows that no actual notice was ever given to
Finan and that she did not learn of the transfer and make demand for payment until after 22
February 2006. (R. at 102. 183.) The lower court found that Adams* 1999 filing with the county
recorder was a public record, and that Finan lacked due diligence by failing to discover the

record for eight years, even though Adams had not otherwise defaulted on the note and no
triggering event occurred that would give rise to inquiry notice. (R. at 609: 611.)
Appellants argue that Finan was under no duty to check with the Davis County Recorder's
Office on a day-to-day basis, if needs be. to discover a triggering event for bringing a cause of
action in this case. The Utah Supreme Court agreed in Christenson v. Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Company. 666 P.2d 302. (UT App 1984). The case regarded fraud and
misrepresentation in real estate development, and the court said "Generally a failure to examine
public records does not defeat an action for a false representation because in most cases there is
no duty to make such an examination. Thus, it has been held that in a fraud case a plaintiff who
contracts to buy property is under no duty to examine public records to ascertain the true state of
title claimed by the seller/* Id. at 307.
Although the court was speaking on factual issues not directly on point with the instant case,
the thrust of its language remains. There is no duty to examine public records for recording
actions, particularly in cases of fraud or false representation, which Appellant's allege were
factors in this case. In 2011, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld Christenson by deciding that "In
general, Utah law does not require one to inspect the public record to verify the truthfulness of
statements made to him or her/* Timothy v. Keetch. 251 P.3d 848, (UT App 2011). Because the
courts have consistently held that a person is not required to continually inspect the public
record, the Appellants were wrongly decided to have constructive notice of the 1999 transfers.
To demonstrate the absurdity of the court's conclusions, one needs merely to consider a
situation where a party could record a contractual document and thereby defeat the contract
embodied within the document. Recording statutes like Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) are
meant to protect bona fide purchasers of real estate. As early as 1894. the Supreme Court of

Utah recognized that recording statutes existed to protect ''innocent purchasers for valuable
consideration." Drake v. ReggeL 10 Utah 376. 37 P. 583. 584 (1894). To impute constructive
notice for a contract claim based on a real estate recording statute goes against the very purpose
of the statute and results in inequity and injustice to Appellants.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THERE WERE NOT
MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE AND THAT APPELLEE DID NOT CONCEAL
THE 1999 TRANSFER OF TITLE, AND IN DENYING APPELLANTS' RULE
60(b) MOTION REGARDING THE SAME
In the memoranda filed in support of their 30 July 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment,

Appellants argued that Appellee's failure to provide any notice to his sister of the transfers he
made to his wife and later to his trust amounted to concealment under the circumstances. (R. at
88.) Because of these concealments, Appellants were not put on notice that the transfers had
taken place and the statute of limitations for challenging breaches of contract began to run. The
court also determined that Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule did not apply to this action because
Appellants could have discovered evidence of Appellee's actions by due diligence. (R. at 60811.) Although the particular issues regarding the statute of limitations will be addressed below,
the present issue deals specifically with Appellee's fraudulent concealment of his transfers of
title, most importantly the 22 January 1999 transfer.
The District Court erred in finding that Appellee did not conceal the 22 January 1999 transfer
by not giving Appellants* newly discovered evidence the proper weight it deserved and
incorrectly assuming Appellants had a duty to monitor recording records. In April 201L after
the court heard Appellants' and Appellee's arguments for summary judgment in July and August
2010. and after the court's final judgment was issued in April 201 L Appellants discovered a
petition from an unrelated proceeding and relating to Appellee's fraudulent concealment of his
1999 property transfer. (R. at 439-477.) Filed in November 2006. the document is titled Petition

to Approve Payment of Promissory Note and Authorize Partial Distribution of Estate
("Petition"'). (R. at 469.) Using the Petition. Appellee sought court approval to pay his obligation
to his sister. Frankie Emley. under the terms of the promissory note to Ms. Emley* s estate, of
which he was one of the personal representatives. (R. at 468-474.) Following the payment of
such obligation. Appellee asked the court to approve the transfer of that payment back to himself
under the terms of the Frankie Emley Trust Agreement. The second issue addressed by the
Petition involved Appellee's request for an order from the court forcing the original Plaintiff in
this action, Carmen Finan, to pay interest to the estate of Frankie Emley. (R. at 468-474.)
In his request to the court seeking permission to pay his obligation to Frankie Emley under
the terms of the Promissory Note, Appellee stated that at the time, u[t]he [Promissory] Note is
not currently due and payable because no portion of the Farm Property has been sold. Petitioner
is not dead, and there has been no foreclosure, tax sale, bankruptcy of the Maker or any other
event of transfer.'* (R. at 469, emphasis not in original.) In other words, stated at that time,
Appellee represented to the original Plaintiff in this action that (1) the Promissory Note was not
currently due, and (2) that no event of transfer had occurred. However, these statements directly
contradict arguments that Appellee made in his memorandum supporting his cross-motion for
summary judgment, where he claimed that transfers had been made as early as 1999, the
happening of which prevented Appellants* from bringing a timely action under the six-year
statute of limitations. (R. at 181.) See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment generally (R. at 177.) Similar claims that
there was a transfer were made in Adams pleadings, see R. at 17. Further, because Appellee
affirmatively claimed in a prior judicial proceeding that no event of transfer had occurred, he
should be judicially stopped from now arguing that the statute of limitations bars Appellants*

claims. Appellants raised this issue with the lower court and the court failed to rule on this issue.
(R. 450-51.)
A. The District Court erred in denying Appellants' Rule 60(b) Motion regarding
Appellee's 1999 transfer of title.
The District Court held, in its Ruling and Order on Appellants* Rule 60 Motion for Relief
from Order, that, under due diligence. Appellants could have discovered the Petition in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 608-614.) But
this must be done within ten days of the order, and the document was not discovered until later.
Appellee argued and the lower court agreed that because the Petition is part of the court's docket
in the probate proceedings for the estate of Frankie Emley, it was therefore public record subject
to discovery. Id. The court also relied on the fact that Appellants* counsel's law firm
represented Appellants' predecessor-in-interest in the estate proceeding, and because of this fact,
Appellants' should have been aware of the Petition in time to make a Rule 59(b) motion. (R. at
608-614.) While it is correct that Brad Smith, an attorney in the law firm of Appellants* counsel,
entered an appearance late in the Emley matter, nothing was ever filed in that case subsequent to
Mr. Smith's appearance and the case was dismissed due to inactivity.
However, Appellants reassert the fact that the recent discovery of the Petition is
understandable in the context of this case. Although the original Plaintiff in this action had been
aware of the Appellee's Petition, she passed away, leaving the current Appellants to finish this
litigation. (R. at 53, 55. 57.) Having had no involvement in the prior litigation, the current
Appellants were unaware of the representations made by the Appellee to the original Plaintiff in
the Petition until April 2011. after its motion for summary judgment had been submitted. (R. at
476.) In light of this new evidence and the Appellee's concealment of the two transfers of the
property subject to the Promissory Note. Appellants believed that the District Court's final

judgment was in error and sought relief from portions of the final judgment ordered on 7 April
2011 using their Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 437, 439.) Despite urging the court to find that the
newly discovered evidence suggested that Appellee concealed information related to Appellants*
cause of action and therefore the statute of limitations should be tolled, the court ruled against
the Rule 60(b) motion, which was filed within the time limit set by the rule.
Appellants* argument in support of the 60(b) motion was the same used to show that
Appellee fraudulently concealed the transfers of the property in question, in violation of the
original Note. Based on the nature of the agreement memorialized in the Promissory Note and
Trust Deed, the expectation of the parties was that these siblings would deal openly and honestly
with one another in order to effect an equitable distribution of their mother* s estate. Appellee's
failure to notify Appellants of either of the transfers of the property violated the spirit of the
agreement and reflected an intention by Appellee to conceal these transfers in an attempt to
defraud Appellants.
The later discovery of Appellee's Petition provided a concrete illustration of the Appellee's
active attempts to conceal the transfers and provides factual confirmation of the Appellants'
allegations. In a signed Petition to the court, Appellee, through the counsel representing him in
this matter, made two false declarations: First that the Promissory Note was not due; and second,
that no event of transfer had occurred. (R. at 468-474.) At the time that Appellee made these
statements, he had in fact transferred the Finan property on two separate occasions, and had
argued supporting this point in his original memorandum for cross-motion for summary
judgment. Indeed, winning this argument was imperative to Appellee's statute of limitations
defense, which was later acknowledged by the court as applicable. At the time that Appellee
made these statements, he had in fact transferred the property on two separate occasions, and

therefore, under the terms of the Promissory Note, his obligation to Appellants was currently
due. Accordingly, the court incorrectly decided the finding of fact that ''Adams did not conceal
the January 22. 1999 Transfer of title to the Property" in its 7 April 2011 findings of fact.
Further, the court reasoned in its order denying Appellants* Rule 60 motion that Adams position
in 2006 saying that no transfer occurred was consistent with later statements in this litigation. (R.
at 611.) Nothing could be further from the truth. (See R. at 17 and 181.) the court went on to
argue that the Plaintiffs had to make an initial showing of why it did not meet the statute of
limitations and did not despite the evidence that Adams failed to notify his sister of his transfers
and claimed directly to Finan in the Emley estate matter that no transfer had taken place in 2006.
Little did she know that he would make the opposite argument one year later to defeat her claims
once she made demand for payment and sued him.
The Utah Court of Appeals has previously dealt with issues of fraudulent concealment and
their relationship to a statute of limitations. In Russell/Packard Development. Inc. v. Carson, the
court quoted other precedent cases when it said
"Under the discovery rule, it is the knowledge of injury which triggers the
statute [of limitations], not notice of probable or possible injur}7. If the plaintiff
can make a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate
that, given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the claim earlier, the statute of limitations is tolled.'* Russell/Packard
Development. Inc. v. Carson. 78 P.3d 616 at 621 (Utah App 2003).
In the instant case. Appellants have offered evidence that they neither had knowledge
of the injur}7 nor notice of probable or possible injury until after the running of the statute
of limitations. Appellants also feel they have made a prima facie showing of Appellee's
concealment by providing the Petition and Appellee's untrue statements to court.
Questions of whether or not statements are true or whether something did or didn't
happen are questions of fact and not law. Thus, there were material facts in dispute when

the District Court ruled on Appellants* and Appellee's motion and cross-motion for
summary judgment.
In another trust case which w7as disputed among family members, the Utah Court of Appeals
dealt with a similar concealment issue. While analyzing the Utah Equitable Discover}' Rule
under a concealment fact pattern, the court said "In examining a concealment claim, 'the rule
requires an evaluation of the reasonableness of a plaintiff s conduct in light of the defendant's
fraudulent or misleading conduct.*" Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 118 P.3d 861 at 866 (Utah App.
2005). As mentioned above, the Appellants' conduct in this action was reasonable under the
circumstances. Appellee concealed not one, but two transfers, and lied in his Petition to the
court regarding the transfers. In light of these circumstances, and considering that Appellants
were not the original parties in this action, their actions are reasonable and deserving of equitable
relief.
Because of Appellee's concealment of these transfers. Appellants' claims fall squarely within
the categories comprehended by Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule, which will be discussed in
greater depth as a separate issue below. As a result of Appellee's fraud and misrepresentation
which was uncovered by the discovery of new evidence, the court erred when it incorrectly
rejected Appellants* Rule 60(b) argument. Appellants* should thus be granted relief from the
court's 7 April 2011 order, or in the alternative, have the court's ruling on their Rule 60(b)
motion reversed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT APPELLANTS WERE
BARRED BY THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-2-309(2) AND IN ITS DECISION TO NOT APPLY THE
EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE
In its Final Judgment and Finding/Conclusions the lower court found that there was no

concealment in providing record notice, and that Appellants produced no competent evidence

that Adams was misleading his sister. (R. at 411-13.) As discussed above, there is ample
evidence of such misleading, concealing and. in fact, fraudulent behavior by Adams. The
evidence relied upon by the court is the same evidence presented by Appellants and noted in the
above section. Id.; 609-11. The District Court's finding that the Appellee did not conceal the 22
January 1999 transfer of title to the property directly affects the court's later decision of barring
the Appellants* claim under the six-year statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2309(2). This law prescribes a six-year statute of limitations ''upon any contract obligation, or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing/* Id. According to Appellee's memorandum in
support of his cross-motion for summary judgment, it is an undisputed fact that Appellants'
claims are based on contract, specifically, the Note. (R. at 184.) Paragraph D of the Note states
that it is "due and payable upon sale, assignment, or transfer* of the Property. (R. at 113.)
Appellee argued that Appellants' claims should be dismissed with prejudice because Utah law
holds that "a statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues." Clarke v.
Living Scriptures. Inc., 2005 UT App 225,1(9, 114 P.3d 602. (R. at 184.) Appellee also states in
his memorandum supporting his cross-motion for summary judgment that "... if a breach
occurred, as pled by Plaintiffs, it occurred on January 22, 1999'* when Appellee transferred his
interest in the property to his wife as tenants in common. (R. at 185.)]
However, in the Petition later discovered by Appellants. Appellee made a statement
completely contradicting his previous assertion that the breach occurred on 22 January 1999. (R.
at 468-474.) In Appellee's request to the court seeking permission to pay his obligation to
Frankie Emley under the terms of the Promissory Note in November 2006. Appellee stated that
at the time. iC[t]he [Promissory] Note is not currently due and payable because no portion of the

1

However, see Section IV regarding the non-transference that occurred because Adams transferred the property to
himself and to his wife as joint tenants. Supra page 20.

Farm Property has been sold, Petitioner is not dead, and there has been no foreclosure, tax sale,
bankruptcy of the Make or any other event of transfer." (R. at 469.) Thus, although Appellee
argued that the 22 January 1999 transfer in fact occurred, beginning the six-year statute of
limitations period, he later says in the Promissory Note that "there has been no foreclosure, tax
sale, bankruptcy of the Maker or any other event of transfer/* Certainly, Appellee cannot have it
both ways. This contradiction further displays Appellee's fraudulent intent and penchant to blow
both hot and cold, depending on what best suits his needs.
In its 6 January 2012 ruling and order on Appellants* Rule 60 motion, the District Court
held that there are uno unusual or exceptional circumstances that warrant the relief Plaintiffs seek
under Rule 60(b)(6)." (R. at 413, 612.) Despite Appellee's written assertion to the contrary in
the 2006 Promissory Note, the court held that the Note became due and payable in January 1999,
making Appellants* claim in September 2007 untimely under the statute of limitations.
However, as mentioned above. Appellants argue that the court erred in its decision not to grant
relief under their Rule 60(b) motion. Appellants made an equity argument that Appellee's
concealment of his property transfers unjustly allowed the statute of limitations to begin, even
though Appellants had no notice of these transfers. The court notes that relief under Rule 60(b)
should be sparingly invoked and used only in unusual and exceptional circumstances. In the
instant case. Appellants* assert a rightful claim to $126,418.30 (which is Finan's share of the
appraised value of the property) of their mother's share of inherited property. The court decided
to deny Appellants any right to this claim, or any claim at all. due to the running of a statute of
limitations that Appellee himself has said began in 1999 but later refuted. Such circumstances
seem to satisfy the exceptional circumstances alluded to by the court.

Although Appellee stated in its 2006 Promissory Note that i%there has been no
foreclosure, tax sale, bankruptcy of the Maker or any other event of transfer." the District Court
did not allow Appellants relief from its 7 April 2011 conclusion of law that "Plaintiffs' causes of
action accrued when Adams failed to make immediate payment to Ms. Finan following the
Property's 1999 Transfer of title.*' (R. at 414.) The court also concluded in the same document
that "this case does not present exceptional circumstances that would justify an equitable tolling
of the statute of limitations'* and that "Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule tolling the applicable
statute of limitations does not apply to this matter.** (R. at 414.) However, Appellants' feel that
the court erred in its decision not to apply Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule to the applicable
facts.
A. Appellee's fraudulent concealment triggered Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule
and the 1999 transfer would not begin the statutory period until Appellants
learned about said transfer
As noted above. Appellants assert that Appellee's fraudulent concealment triggered
Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule. Utah's Equitable Discover Rule was elucidated in Russell/
Packard Development. Inc.. v. Carson, a case decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 2005. 2005
UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. In that case, the court said that the Utah Equitable Discovery Rule tolls a
limitations period until a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts
forming the basis for his or her cause of action. The court explains that
"When a defendant fraudulently causes a plaintiff to delay in bringing a cause of
action, the discovery rule balances (1) the policy underlying all statutes of limitations to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared, with (2) the policy of not allowing a defendant who has concealed his
wrongdoing to profit from his concealment." Id. at 748.
In the interests of justice. Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule is limited to only two narrow
situations. The first situation is where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action

because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct. Id. As discussed above.
Appellee's fraudulent behavior concerning the Petition and his statements to the court likely
constitute concealment or misleading conduct, as does his failure to notify Finan of the 1999 and
2005 transfers. The second situation where the Equitable Discovery Rule applies is when a case
presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discover}' of the cause of
action. Id. With the facts of this case in mind—especially between family members to cut a deal
to correct Adams* taking a larger portion of their parents' estate, and then never making
payments on the note with open terms of repayment, not to mention Adams' material
misrepresentations to his sister about the lack of a transfer and that the note is not current due—
Appellants argue that this is a case that indeed presents the exceptional circumstances required,
due to expectations of honesty among family members and the value of the property at stake.
However, Appellants likely make a stronger case under the first situation, since evidence of
Appellee's concealment has been proven. Assuming Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule governs
the situation, the statute of limitations for Appellee's 1999 transfer would to tolled until Finan
discovered the basis of facts which govern her original cause of action.
IV.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT APPELLEE'S TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY INTO
HIS AND HIS WIFE'S NAME AS JOINT TENANTS WAS AN EVENT OF
TRANSFER SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER OBLIGATIONS TO PLAINTIFF
If the Court of Appeals rejects the arguments presented above. Appellants argue in the

alternative that Appellee's 1999 transfer was not an event that triggered the payment obligations
under the original Note. If the court does not apply Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule, the statute
of limitations is not triggered by the 1999 transfer because no transfer took place in 1999.

Paragraph A of the Note states that i;[i]n the event the title to the real property . . . securing
this note is sold, assigned or transferred for any reason or in any manner, then the entire
remaining balance of this note is immediately due and payable." (R. at 108.) Paragraph D of the
Note states that u[t]his note shall be due and payable upon sale, assignment or transfer of the real
property and/or water rights securing this note . . . or in the event of. . . any other event of
transfer." (R. at 109.) Under these terms, a transfer of any kind or for any reason made the Note
due and payable and thus started the clock running on Appellants' cause of action. Upon closer
inspection of the 1999 transfer, however, Appellants argue in the alternative that no conveyance
actually took place because this was not the type of transfer contemplated that would trigger
default.
Appellee will not dispute that in 1999. the property in question was conveyed by Adams to
himself and his wife, Diana C. Adams, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. at 181.)
By transferring to himself, Adams still owned the property. Under a common law joint tenancy
with right of survivorship, if Appellee's wife died. Appellee himself would retain sole possession
of the property. A transfer or conveyance to one's self is not a transfer, or at least not the kind of
transfer anticipated and mentioned in the original Note. (R. at 108-110.) If Appellee maintains
control after "transferring" the property in question, Appellants rightfully argue that no transfer
took place and that the statute of limitations didn't begin running until the 2005 transfer which
legally placed the property in a trust. Finan brought suit in 2007, just months after learning
about the transfers for the first time. The 2004-5 transfer w7as thus within the six-year statute of
limitations.
Even if the court does deem the 1999 conveyance a transfer, at a minimum. Appellee kept a
half interest to himself so the statute of limitations that allegedly began to run at that time only

applies to his wife's half of the property. At least half of the property would not be subject to the
statute of limitations which the District Court decided had begun to run upon the 1999 transfer.
This alternative argument was raised to the court below (see R. at 587). but the court failed to
limit Adams' judgment accordingly or address the issue, factually or legally.
V.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE STATUTE USED BY THE DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102, SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS BEING VOID
FOR VAGUENESS AND VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
The statute used by Appellee to convince the court that Appellants had constructive notice of

the 1999 transfer should be struck down in this case and amended to avoid similar problems in
the future. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) reads, in relevant part, that
"Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by this
title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with Section 57-4a-3,
whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1 -4,
and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged
shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all
persons of their contents." Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1)
However, this statute merely mentions that a document executed under the terms of Title 57
shall impart notice to all persons upon its recording. Although the statute falls under the Real
Estate portion of the Utah Code Annotated (Title 57). the statute itself says nothing about real
estate or about real estate documents being recorded. This omission, whether intentional or not.
is precisely what allowed Appellee to successfully argue for the running of the statute of
limitations. Adams used this statute to essentially record a conveyance to himself, at least in
part, and to his wife as joint tenants. After recording the quit-claim deed which signified the
transfer, Appellee successfully started the statute of limitations running, even though no real
estate was purchased for valuable consideration which is the intent of such recording statutes.
Thus, as applied. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) is too broad in scope, is unconstitutionally
vague, and should be struck.

Appellants also argue that due to such broad language in the recording statute, they were
essentially robbed of due process by having the property taken from them without notice. Such
seizure of property, under authority of a state statute, is in violation of the United States and Utah
Constitutions by violating substantive and procedural due process rights as well.
VI.

THE TRUST DEED AND NOTE PLACED CERTAIN PAYMENT
OBLIGATIONS ON ADAMS UPON THE SALE, ASSIGNMENT, OR TRANSFER
OF THE PROPERTY AND THE NOTE CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSY
OBLIGATED ADAMS TO MAKE IMMEDIATE PAYMENT TO FINAN UPON
THE TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY
The trial court's findings of fact under the terms of the parties' agreement memorialized in

the Trust Deed and Note. Appellants are entitled to receive funds from Appellee correlated to the
value of the property. The parties* agreement provided no fixed date for payment of the amount
due as the parties anticipated that Appellants would receive a greater amount as the property
appreciated. The note originally acknowledged that the uratio of the note value to the property
value is 20.27%)," and Appellants are entitled to judgment for half of that, or 10.135%). given that
Finan* s sister's interest reverted to Adams. (R. at 94.)
Those funds became due and payable to Finan and interest began to accrue on either of two
transfers of the secured property which were voluntarily executed by Appellee. The first transfer
occurred in 1999. when Adams transferred the property so as to grant his wife an interest. The
second transfer occurred when Adams and his wife transferred the secured property to family
trusts. Legal transfers occurred on both occasions, and the property was twice alienated. These
transfers, which were both made without notice to or consent from Finan, triggered Appellee's
obligation to Finan (and therefore to Appellants) under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, which
specifically mandates that the note •'shall be due and payable upon sale, assignment, or
transfer., .or any other event of transfer.'* (R. at 94.)

Under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. "If default occurs in the payment of said Trust Deed
Note or in the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the
holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal
balance due and payable.** (R. at 95.) To that end. Appellee executed a trust deed, securing real
property and accompanying water shares. Appellant Finan first made a demand for payment after
February 2006 (R. at 183). and Adams failed to make payment. Having defaulted under the
agreement, Appellants are entitled to sell the property, and should receive the greater of
$13,170.00 plus interest or 10.135% of the "said sales price as the amount due on [the] note,'* to
which she is entitled under paragraph (C) of the Trust Deed Note should the sales price exceed
the stipulated 1991 value. (R. at 95.) Moreover, given the passage of time, the value of the
property has risen dramatically since the agreement was originally made and is now valued at
$1.25 million pursuant to Appellants* appraisal.
The trial court did not dispute any of the above in its findings of fact. See R. 409-15.
However, it simply noted that the statute of limitations barred Appellants* action.
Appellants are therefore entitled to 10.135% of the property's sales price as envisioned by
the contract, which is estimated at $126,418.30 (10.135% of 1.25 million) (R. at 95.) or are
entitled to an order of foreclosure (by the trustee or themselves) pursuant to the terms of the
Trust Deed and 10.135%) of the property's sales price. In addition, the court confirmed there is
an attorney's fee and costs provision in the contract. (R. at 412). Appellants were not granted
their summary judgment and. as the non-prevailing party, were denied their attorney's fees.
They now7 respectfully request their fees and costs.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Defendants respectfully request that the Court of Appeals do the
following:
•

Reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment to Defendant.

•

Grant Appellants* motion for summary judgment.

•

Order that Appellee is in default on the Note.
Order the payment of the property's appreciated value as envisioned by the Note and
Trust Deed, which is estimated at $126,418.30 (10.135% of appraised value of $1.25
million) or in the alternative, order the foreclosure of the trust deed (order trustee or
Appellants to sell the property and pay 10.135% of the sales price to Appellants).
Award Appellants their reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the
Note and Trust Deed and request that this Court remand to the District Court for a
determination of the reasonable fees and costs.
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ADDENDA

The following are exhibits provided for the ease of the court in referencing key documents
related to this appeal:
•

Trust Deed Note ("Note"), executed on May 13. 1991

•

Trust Deed, executed on May 13, 1991

•

2006 Petition by Adams in the Emley estate matter claiming no transfer of the property
occurred

•

7 April 2010 Final Judgment and Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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TRUST DEED

(3^ day of"--JOQ^Sk.
THIS TRUST DEED is •made this
1991/ between LUKE L..-. ADAMS, as ••Trustor ,'."• whose. -addr¥^g;is ' .7,77"
East Gentile -Street, Xfayton, Utah 8404! ;;and ; ;SeGur&y^:Title-:^
Company, Farmington, Utah, as Trustee, and: CARMEN,:RV:^FINAN% ahd'V&v
FRANKIE A. EMLEY, as Beneficiary/' tenants - in-commonVEa^^o a'.'n.one-half (1/2) interest each, •.-•*'
' ','};\''/••*J;-^!^V-- '^7;:^
%
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE.' ,IN' TRUST.,"';•'•'.
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property .situ&ted-'in ^%
Davis County, Utan:
'.V\ • •• :.:'*$£;n >£

I-V--

Parcel #1: BEG 366.5 FT W & 3 3 FT S FR T K ' N E COR 0F:iNWl/4-:0F,:^EC^
29. T4N-R1W? SLM: TH W 30 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 9.0 .FT^ TH ].K' 200 '.$&:
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TO PT DUE S OF BEG; TH N 1275 FT TO BEG. CONT 8.95 ACRES • v. •/ .' '"^

\|- 'Olfr-.ODSSTogether with ten (10) shares; of, Davis and Weber Canal;
Company and ten (10) shares of Stevenson' s .Straight .Ditch'Company^
water rights.
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements'
thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements,. rents/•••.
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditament, privileges', and',
appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed -withsaid property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payments of the indebtedness
evidenced by a [promissory note of even . da,te "herewith, in- the
principal sum of $26 ,340.00] , payable to the order of Beneficiaryat the* times and in the mariner as therein set forth, and payment
of any Bums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the "•
security hereof.
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Exhibit B

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed
securing same, must be surrendered to Trustee for cancellation,
before reconveyance will be made.

$26,340.00

Layton, Utah
'• '
•-/•••

1991

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally,
promise to pay to the order of FRANK-IE A. EMLEY and CARMEN R.
FINAN, tenants- in- common, as to a one-half interest each,
Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Forty and No/100 Dollars
($26,340.00), together with interest from date at the rate of
Zero per cent (0%) per annum on the unpaid principal, said
principal and interest payable as follows:
A. In the event the title to the real property in section
29, T4N, R1W SLB & M, Davis County, Utah, and. more fully
described as follows:
Parcel #1: BEG 366.5 FT W & 33
29. T4N-R1W; SLM: TH W 30 FT.
FT, TH W 94.4 FT. TH S 200 FT,
311.95 FT, TH N 1287 FT TO BEG.

FT S FR TH NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC
TH S 200 FT, TH W 90 FT, TH N 200
TH W 97.45 FT. TH S 1087 FT, TH E
CONT. 8.414 ACRES

Parcel #2: BEG AT APT ON S BNDY LN OF LAYTON TOWN;. W 366.5 FT &
S 1320 FT FR NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC 29; T4N-R1W; SLK: TH W 311.95
FT; TH S 836 FT TO E'LY R/W LN OF DRG RY; TH S 33D18'E 545 FT MOL
TO PT DUE S OF BEG? TH N 1275 FT TO BEG. CONT 8.95 ACRES
securing this note is sold, assigned or transferred for any
reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining balance of
this note is immediately due and payable.
B.
Payee and maker acknowledge that the value of the real
property securing this note was, on October 1, 199 0, $129,942.00;
and therefore, the ratio of the note value to the property value
is 20.27 percent ($26,340.00 divided by $129,942).

C.
In t h e event maker s e l l s t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y securing
t h i s note f o r an amount g r e a t e r t h a n $129,942.00 t h e n t h e mak»r
agrees t o pay FRANKIE A. EMLEY and CARMEN R. FINAN t w e n t y percent
(20%) of s a i d s a l e s price as t h e amount due on t h i s n o t e .
Otherwise, t h e amount due s h a l l be a minimum of $ 2 6 , 3 4 0 . 0 0 .
D. T h i s n o t e s h a l l be due and payable upon s a l e , assignment
or t r a n s f e r of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y a n d / o r water r i g h t s securing
t h i s note by T r u s t Deed of even d a t e herewith or upon t h e death
of maker o r i n t h e event of f o r e c l o s u r e , tax s a l e , bankruptcy of
maker or any o t h e r event of t r a n s f e r .
E.
Any s a l e , t r a n s f e r ,
assignment, bankruptcy,
or
d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e property s e c u r i n g t h i s note w i t h i n twelve (12)
months a f t e r t h i s note has been paid off wherein t h e maker
receives c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e r e f o r e i n excess, of $129,942.00 w i l l
e n t i t l e p a y e e s t o t h e incremental a d d i t i o n a l amount of 20.2 7
percent of such consideration l e s s $26,340.00 p r e v i o u s l y p a i d .
This l i e n c a n n o t be disposed of by an a c t of Bankruptcy by t h e
Trustor.
F.
A l l payments are to be made -payable t o payees and a r e
t o be d e l i v e r e d t o them.
Any such payments not p a i d when due s h a l l b e a r i n t e r e s t
t h e r e a f t e r a t t h e r a t e of Twelve p e r c e n t |§||&jjr p e r annum u n t i l
paid.
If d e f a u l t o c c u r s in the payment of s a i d T r u s t Deed Note
or in. t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of any agreement contained i n t h e Trust
Deed s e c u r i n g t h i s n o t e , the h o l d e r hereof, a t i t s o p t i o n and
w i t h o u t n o t i c e or demand, may d e c l a r e t h e e n t i r e p r i n c i p a l
balance due and p a y a b l e .
If t h i s n o t e i s c o l l e c t e d by an a t t o r n e y a f t e r d e f a u l t i n
t h e payment of p r i n c i p a l or i n t e r e s t , e i t h e r with o r without
s u i t , t h e u n d e r s i g n e d agrees t o pay a l l c o s t s and expenses of
c o l l e c t i o n i n c l u d i n g a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
The m a k e r s , s u r e t i e s , g u a r a n t o r s and e n d o r s e r s hereof
s e v e r a l l y w a i v e presentment for payment, demand and n o t i c e of
dishonor and nonpayment of t h i s n o t e , and consent t o any and a l l
e x t e n s i o n s of t i m e , renewals, w a i v e r s or m o d i f i c a t i o n s t h a t may
be granted by t h e holder hereof w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e payment or
o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s n o t e , and t o the r e l e a s e of any
s e c u r i t y , o r any p a r t thereof, with o r without s u b s t i t u t i o n .

This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

DATED:

f\Vl/\ I *^K , 1991.

A

\

/';S<'J?£.
LUKE L. ADAMS

Jf
^/i 2v&4n/L''

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

I
-Hr\
day of
1991r
IL'-V.
personally appeared "before me LUKE L. ADAKS, one of the signer(s)
of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
On

the

'
Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

-ii..
*j

>-

Exhibit C

David O. Parkinson, USB No. 2527
CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH

10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: 801-530-7300
Attorneys for Petitioner, Luke L. Adams

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
FRANKIE JOAN ADAMS EMLEY,
ALSO KNOWN AS FRANKIE A.
EMLEY AND FRANKIE J. EMLEY,
DECEASED.

PETITION TO APPROVE
PAYMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE
AND AUTHORIZE PARTIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
Probate No.: 063700360
Judge Michael G. Allphin

David O. Parkinson, as counsel of record for Petitioner, Luke L. Adams, states and represents to the

1.

On October 30, 2006, Petitioner was appointed by the Court as personal representative of
the Estate of the decedent.

PAYMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE
2.

Petitioner, individually, is the maker of a promissory note dated May 13, 1991, which is
payable to Frankie A. Emley and Carmen P.. Finan, as tenants-in-common (the "Note").
A copy of the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

3.

The Note is secured by certain real property located in Layton, Utah and associated water
rights (collectively, the "Farm Property").

4.

Paragraph D of the Note provides as follows:
"This Note shall be due and payable upon sale, assignment or transfer of
the real property and/or water rights securing this Note by Trust Deed of
even date herewith or upon the death of Maker or in the event of
foreclosure, tax sale, bankruptcy of Maker or any other event of transfer."

5.

The Note is not currently due and payable because no portion of the Farm Property has
been sold, Petitioner is not dead, and there has been no foreclosure, tax sale, bankruptcy
of Maker or any other event of transfer.

6.

Paragraph C of the Note provides as follows:
In the event Maker sells the real property securing this Note for an amount
greater than One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Nine Hundred FortyTwo and 00/100 Dollars ($129,942.00), then the Maker agrees to pay
Frankie A. Emley and Carmen R. Finan twenty percent (20%) of said sales
price as the amount due on this Note. Otherwise, the amount due shall be
a minimum of Twenty Six Tnousand Three Hundred Forty and 00/100
Dollars ($26,340.00V (Emphasis added.)

7.

Pursuant to paragraph C of the Note, because the Farm Property has not been sold and
there has been no "event of transfer," the amount due to Frankie A. Emley is one-half (Vi)
of Twenty Six Thousand Three Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($26,340.00) or
Thirteen Thousand One Hundred Seventy and 00/100 Dollars ($13,170.00).

8.

Petitioner desires to pay that portion of the Note payable to Frankie A. Emley and seeks
Court approval of the transaction, as provided in Section 75-3-712 of the Utah Code
Annotated for transactions by a personal representative involving a conflict of interest.

PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
9.

As personal representative of the Estate, Petitioner first published notice to creditors on
November 9, 2006, but has not yet received notice from any creditor of Frankie A. Emley
of any amount owed.

10.

Federal and state income tax returns for Frankie A. Emley for years through and including
2005 have been filed and any taxes due have been paid.

11.

To the best knowledge of Petitioner, all medical and funeral expenses for Frankie A.
Emley have been paid.

12.

The only anticipated expenses remaining for the Estate are legal fees for administration
and accounting fees for preparing income tax returns for 2006 and 2007.

13.

Paragraph 2.2 of the Will of Frankie A. Emley provides for distribution of all assets of the
estate following her death to the Trustee of the Frankie A. Emley Trust.

-32000108.1

14.

Petitioner is the Trustee of the Frankie A. Emley Trust and has served in that capacity
since the Trust was established on November 12, 1998.

15.

Petitioner has deposited into an account in the name of the Estate the total sum of Twelve
Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($12,000.00), and the Estate will receive not less than Eight
Hundred Seventeen and 46/100 ($817.45) per month (one-third (1/3) of each required
monthly payment of Two Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Two and 40/100 Dollars
($2,452.40)) as its one-third (1/3) share of payments due under the Promissory Note
payable by Delene Hyde and Kevin Blair.

16.

With payment of the Promissory Note in the amount of Thirteen Thousand One Hundred
Seventy and 00/100 Dollars ($13,170.00), the total amount deposited into the Estate
account will exceed Twenty Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($25,000.00).

17.

Petitioner requests that he be allowed to make a partial distribution to himself as Trustee
of the Frankie A. Emley Trust of the sum of Fifteen Thousand and 00/100 Dollars
($15,000.00).

ACCOUNTING AND PAYMENT OF INTEREST
18.

At the hearing held October 30, 2006, the Court ordered that Carmen R. Finan pay to
Petitioner, as personal representative of the Estate of Frankie A. Emley, one-third (1/3) of
all proceeds received on the Replacement Note from February 2, 2006 until the date of
payment to Petitioner. Petitioner has received the sum of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred

-42O00108.1

Fifty and 00/100 Dollars ($11,250.00) paid by or on behalf of Carmen R. Finan by checks
dated November 6, 2006.
19.

Although Petitioner requested that Carmen R. Finan remit the interest earned on the sum
of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars ($11,250.00) during the time
the funds were held by her from March 1, 2006 until November 6, 2006, no interest was
paid.

20.

The Estate is entitled to interest on the sum of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty and
00/100 Dollars ($11,250.00) for the time such funds were held by Carmen R. Finan, and
Petitioner requests that she be ordered to pay the interest earned on such amount for the

2,; ••,••*••. period from March 1, 2006 until November 6, 2006 to Luke L. Adams, as personal
representative of the Estate.
21.

In connection with the payment of interest, Petitioner requests that Carmen R. Finan
provide an accounting of interest earned on such amount, including:
a.

Monthly bank account statements for each account in which payments were held
from March 1, 2006 through November 6, 2006;

b.

The names of all legal owners of the account(s); and

c.

The names of all signatories to the account(s).

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT:
1.

The Court fix a time and place of hearing.

-52OOOI08.1

DATED: November 21, 2006

/L^J£.

&.£.

DAVID O. PARKINSON (#2527)
Callister Nebeker & McCullough
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
(801)530-7300

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
: ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
David O. Parkinson, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are
true, accurate, and complete to the best of petitioner's knowledge and belief.

David O. Parkinson
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of November, 2006.

-y^^s
NOTARtJUBLIC
*
Residing at: fi\SO s , i JQo £ . J^J^J^
My commission expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC f
» W ? P 9 l r t t R" C o r s o n
A ri,t(*?u,lXCTer
"P'«.Sie.
BOO '
lly
Utah
841

'•»

u 7^*
'
33
«*y Commitsion Expires

November 8, 2008
STATE O F UTAH

-7- •
2000108.1

Gj^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION TO APPROVE
PAYMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE AND AUTHORIZE PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE was served upon counsel of record at the addresses listed below by hand delivery or by
depositing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid on this 21st day of November,
2006.

Felshaw King
KING & KING
330 North Main
Kaysville, Utah 84037

-82OO0I08.1

Exhibit D

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
T. RICHARD DAVIS (0836)
THOMAS B. PRICE (8254)
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Zions Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127
trdavis@,cnmlaw.com
tpricei@cnmlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINE B. HELFRICH, and MARY
.\
ANNE CHESAREK, Successors and
j
Representatives of Carmen R. Finan Estate, and !
TRUSTEES to the CARMEN R. ADAMS
j
FINAN REVOCABLE TRUST,
j
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LUKE L. ADAMS, an individual,
Defendant.

j
j

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER
Case No. 070700508
Judge John R. Morris

|
!

On or about December 13, 2010, this Court presided over the scheduled hearing for a
number of motions filed by the parties, in the above-captioned action. Plaintiffs were
represented by David B. Stevenson of the law firm of Stevenson & Smith, P.C. Defendant Luke
L. Adams (" Adams") was represented by Thomas B. Price of the law firm Callister Nebeker &

555985.1

McCullough. At the hearing the Court considered pleadings filed and argument presented on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance;
Adams' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; and Adams' Motion to Strike Declarations. The
Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance from the bench at the conclusion of
the hearing and stated that the Court would take the remainder of the motions under advisement
and render a written ruling.
On or about February 4, 2011, the Court issued its Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike (the "Ruling"). The Court, in its Ruling, denied Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgement; granted Adams' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, denied
Adams' request for attorneys' fees and costs; and denied Adams' Motion to Strike. The Court
further directed Adams to prepare and submit an Order that is consistent with and reflects the
Ruling.
Pursuant to the Ruling signed and entered by this Court, dated February 4, 2011, and
based upon

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 52, this Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

Carmen R. Finan initiated the above-captioned matter on September 14, 2007,

alleging claims against Adams for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure.1

'Carmen R. Finan, died on September 16, 2009. The successors and representatives of
Ms. Finan's estate and the trustees of Ms. Finan's revocable trust, Christine Helfrich and Mary
Anne Chesarek, were later substituted as party plaintiffs on March 30, 2010 and filed an
amended complaint reflecting the substitution on May 3, 2010.
2
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2.

Ms. Finan and Adams are siblings.

3.

Ms. Finan's claims arose from a trust deed recorded on May 15, 1991, ("Trust

Deed") and trust deed note, dated May 13, 1991, (the "Note") regarding certain real property that
Adams inherited following the deaths of Finan and Adams' parents, Frank and Leona Adams.
4.

The certain real property is described as follows:

Parcel #1: BEG 366.5 FT W & 33 FT S FR TH NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC 29.
T4N-RLW; SLM: TH W 30 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 90 FT, TH N 200 FT, TH
W 94.4 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 97.45 FT. TH S 1087 FT, TH E 311.95 FT, TH
N 1287 FT TO BEG. CON. 8.414 ACRES
Parcel #2: BEG AT APT ON S BNDY LN OF LAYTON TOWN; W 366.5 FT &
S 1320 FT FR NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC 29; T4N-R1W; SLM: TH W 311.95
FT; TH S 836 FT TO E'LY R/W LN OF DRG RY; TH S 33°18' E 545 FT MOL
TO PT DUE S OF BEG; TH N 1275 FT TO BEG. CON 8.95 ACRES
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 are contiguous and are collectively referred to herein as the "Property."
5.

On May 13, 1991, Adams executed the Note in favor of Finan for the principal

amount of $13,170.00 at 0% interest per annum and no due date.
6.

The Note is secured by that certain Trust Deed of even date, duly recorded in the

Official Records of the Davis County Recorder, State of Utah, on May 15, 1991 as Entry No.
927132 at Book 1412 beginning at Page 474.
7.

The subject Trust Deed, recorded May 15, 1991 and the Trust Deed Note placed

certain payment obligations on Adams upon the sale, assignment or transfer of the subject
property.

555985.1

8.

Paragraph A of the Note states that, "In the event the title to the [Property]...

securing this note is sold, assigned or transferred for any reason or in any manner, then the entire
remaining balance of this note is immediately due and payable." See Note, ^ A.
9.

Paragraph D of the Note states that the Note is "due and payable upon sale,

assignment or transfer" of the Property. See Note, ^| D.
10.

Paragraph E of the Note states that uany sale, transfer, assignment, bankruptcy or

disposition of the Property securing this Note within twelve months after this Note has been paid
off wherein the maker [Adams] receives consideration therefore in excess of $129,942.00 will
entitle payee to the incremental additional amount of 20.27% [or 10.135% to Finan] of such
consideration less [the amount previously paid]." See Note, ^| E.
11.

On January 22, 1999, Adams transferred the Property to himself and his wife, as

joint tenants pursuant to a quit claim deed (the "1999 Transfer").
12.

Adams caused the deed for the 1999 Transfer to be recorded with the Davis

County Recorder. The deed was stamped Recorded on January 22, 1999, Book 2434, Page 876.
13.

Adams did not conceal the January 22, 1999 Transfer of title of the Property.

14.

Ms. Finan had actual knowledge of the 1999 Transfer of title sometime after 2001.

15.

The passage of time and Plaintiffs' aged causes of action created difficulties and

prejudice to Adams, as title to the Property transferred a second time after the 1999 transfer and
Ms. Finan cannot be called to testify as a witness.

4
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16.

Paragraph F of the Note provides, "If this note is collected by an attorney after

default in the payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned agrees
to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fees." See Note, fF.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and having reviewed the points and
authorities recited by the parties, and others germane to this matter, the Court hereby makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), failing to submit a required,

supporting affidavit. Id; Aspenwood v. C.A.T., LLC 2003 UT App. 28 Ijf 18-23, 73 P.3d 947.
2.

The Trust Deed, recorded May 15, 1991 and the Trust Deed Note, dated May 13,

1991, placed certain payment obligations on Adams upon the sale, assignment or transfer of the
Property.
3.

Paragraph A of the Note is clear and unambiguously obligated Adams to make

immediate payment to Ms. Finan upon the transfer of the Property of any reason or in any
manner.
4.

On January 22, 1999, Adams transferred title to the Property from his sole

ownership to a joint tenancy between Adams and his wife. Adams also transferred title to the
Property on January 4, 2005.
5.

The 1999 Transfer triggered Defendant's payment obligations under the Note.

6.

Adams failed to make payment to Ms. Finan pursuant to the Note.
5
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7.

Adams did not conceal the 1999 Transfer of title of the Property.

8.

Plaintiff filed this action on September 14, 2007, approximately eight (8) years

and eight (8) months after the Property's 1999 Transfer of title to the Property.
9.

The statute of limitations for actions "upon any contract, obligation, or liability

founded upon an instrument in writing," such as Plaintiffs' causes of action in this case, is six (6)
years.

UTAH CODE ANN.

10.

§ 78B-2-309(2).

Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued when Adams failed to make immediate

payment to Ms. Finan following the Property's 1999 Transfer of title.
11.

Ms. Finan was on constructive notice of the Property's 1999 Transfer and the

accrual of her causes of action by virtue of the recording of Adams' quit claim deed with the
Davis County Recorder's Office.
12.

Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified in the manner prescribed by

[Title 57] shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to
all persons of their contents.
13.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-3-102 (emphasis added).

This court concludes that this case does not present exceptional circumstances that

would justify an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, accordingly Utah's Equitable
Discovery Rule tolling the applicable statute of limitations does not apply to this matter.
14.

The six-year statute of limitations is applicable to this matter.

78B-2-309(2).

6
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§

15.

Plaintiffs' causes of action contained in their Amended Complaint and any and all

claims based upon the Note and Trust Deed are barred as untimely, including but not limited to
the $13,170.00 original principal balance, pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations of
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§ 78B-2-309(2).

16.

Any and all claims, rights, terms, conditions, indebtedness and obligations set

forth by the Note and Trust Deed are cancelled, discharged and declared to be unenforceable.
17.

The Note provides for attorneys' fees, "If this note is collected by an attorney after

default in the payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned agrees
to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorneys' fees. Note, ^ F.
18.

Utah law provides for the reciprocity of the application of an attorneys' fees

awards. "A court may award costs and attorneys fees to either party that prevails in a civil action
based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986,
when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one
party to recover attorneys fees."
19.

UTAH CODE ANN.

The language of UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78B-5-826.

§ 78B-5-826 is not mandatory but allows

courts to exercise discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. See Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007
U T 2 6 , t 17, 160 P.3d 1041.
20.

The award of attorneys' fees to Adams in this case would result in a windfall.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
7
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ORDER
1.

That Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance is denied;

2.

That Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied;

3.

That Adams' Motion to Strike is denied;

4.

That Adams' Motion for Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;

5.

Plaintiffs shall release the Trust Deed and any other incumbrance on the Property,

of which they caused to be placed, immediately; and
6.

That Adams' request for attorneys' fees and costs is denied.

DATED this

day of February, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

B y _ _
Honorable John R. Morris
Second District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

David B. Stevenson, Esq.

8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of this FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was served by United States mail, first class postage
prepaid, on the /V

day of February, 2011, on the following:

David B. Stevenson
Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
T. RICHARD DAVIS (0836)
THOMAS B. PRICE (8254)
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Zions Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127
trdavis@,cnmlaw.com
tpricefg),cnmlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINE B. HELFRICH, and MARY
ANNE CHESAREK, Successors and
Representatives of Carmen R.Finan Estate, and
TRUSTEES to the CARMEN R. ADAMS
FINAN REVOCABLE TRUST,

j
j
j
!
I

FINAL JUDGMENT

Case No. 070700508
Plaintiffs,
Judge John R. Morris

vs.
LUKE L. ADAMS, an individual.
Defendant.

Final Judgment is hereby entered in this action as set forth below, which had been
determined pursuant to this Court's granting of Defendant Luke L. Adams' ("Adams") CrossMotion for Summary Judgement and based upon this Court's February 3, 2011 Ruling and the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order filed concurrently, herewith. Accordingly,

556013.1

it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance

are denied.
2.

Adams' Motion to Strike Declarations is denied. Adams' Motion for Summary

Judgement is granted. Adams' request for attorney's fees is denied.
3.

Plaintiffs' causes of action contained in their Amended Complaint and any and all

claims based upon the Note and Trust Deed are barred as untimely, including but not limited to
the $13,170.00 original principal balance, pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations of UTAH
CODE ANN.

4.

§ 78B-2-309(2).
Any and all claims, rights, terms, conditions, indebtedness and obligations set

forth by the Note and Trust Deed are cancelled, discharged and declared to be unenforceable.
5.

Plaintiffs shall release the Trust Deed and any other incumbrance on the Property,

of which they caused to be placed, immediately.
6.

The above-captioned matter is disposed as to all the parties and finally disposes of

the subject matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.
7.

It is further Ordered that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), this Judgment is

deemed to be the final judgment and the entry thereof is hereby expressly directed.
DATED this

day of February, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

By
Honorable John R. Morris
Second District Court Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

David B. Stevenson, Esq.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of this FINAL JUDGMENT was served by United
States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the/(^'h day of February, 2011, on the following:

David B. Stevenson
Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
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